Adolf Hitler: il Perdente del XX secolo THE BIG MISTAKE OF HITLER in Dunkirk: PERCHÉ?
Di Samuel Ashwood, 22 ottobre 2005
Riguardo alla situazione strategica di Dunkirk, vengono date poche altre spiegazioni, ma in questo articolo, propongo di presentarne una molto trascurata, ma di cui vi sono solide prove.
Dopo la guerra, B. H. Liddell Hart, uno dei più importanti storici militari del 20° secolo, autore di opere, tra le altre, di strategia militare e sulle due guerre mondiali, colse l’opportunità di incontrare, and to question, many key figures of the German war effort. In 1948, he came up with a book based on these conversations, entitled The Other Side of the Hill [The other side of the hill], also published in some places under the title The German Generals Talk [The German generals speak]. I highly recommend this book to all students of military history. There are many topics covered, from the campaigns [military], the plot against Hitler, which culminated in the assassination attempt of July 20, 1944, conflicts between Hitler and the staff, the official views of idolization as Erwin Rommel, the opinions of the chief enemies Germany during the war.
In this basic historical work is being examined Dunkirk. To outline the context: after the victory over Poland in 1939, Hitler advocated an immediate attack against France
on the Western Front, not knowing what
France, which first was reluctant to go to war, he had no intention to conduct an offensive against Germany
, but had designed a defensive campaign, probably with the ultimate goal of winning another war of attrition. Close-ups of Hitler's war and of the General Staff were classified in this strategy, and in fact did not include any goal beyond that of the conquest of certain points strategic value, which would allow them to continue the naval and air war against England. At first, Hitler had planned no total victory, as that obtained in Poland. But the offensive after several postponements due to a combination of circumstances, Hitler eventually adopted the ambitious plan of the brilliant officer Erich von Manstein. L 'Operation Sickle Strike "was the masterpiece that began
France in a few weeks out of action. Powerful German armored forces cut in two the supposedly impenetrable Ardennes Forest, Belgian and French, and they arrived on the coast at full speed, cutting off much of the French army, e l’intero BEF
. Il successo di questo piano è ben conosciuto. Capeggiati da uno dei più grandi geni della guerra corazzata, Heinz Guderian, i tedeschi tagliarono in due le difese francesi, respinsero pochi contrattacchi, e raggiunsero il mare, tagliando fuori migliaia di militari francesi inviati in Belgio, insieme all’intero contingente inglese. Gli alleati sconfitti e demoralizzati si ritirarono lungo la costa, e presto l’unico porto a offrire una via di fuga fu Dunkirk. Gli inglesi e i francesi distrutti si ritirarono verso questo punto.
Gli aggressivi generali tedeschi volevano inseguire il loro nemico defeated its up to Dunkirk, and capture all the cabbages. But, to their great frustration, Hitler gave the order to stop. At first, some German commander tried to ignore him, but Hitler reiterated the order, and the victorious armored forces were detained for three days, allowing the British and the French to flee by sea, despite being targeted by the Luftwaffe.
Because the order to stop senseless, when the enemy was defeated, and without any ability to stop the powerful German army? Later, Hitler gave different excuses for his mistake. To Field Marshal von Kleist, said: "I did not want to send tanks in the swamps of Flanders, and the British did not come home in this war. " To others, he explained that he was concerned about the mechanical failure of many tanks, and armored forces would have enough to finish to isolate the French.
But May 24, 1940, the campaign was still going on, Hitler expressed a deeper reason, more political, staff members of Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt. All this was reported by General Blumentritt to Liddell Hart, and I need to quote extensively the story of Blumentritt:
"Hitler was in high spirits, and he admitted that the course of the campaign was an 'undoubted miracle', and we expressed the opinion that the war would end in six weeks. After that he would like to conclude with France
a reasonable peace, and the road would then be free for an agreement with England.
"He then astonished us speaking with admiration of the British Empire, of the necessity of its existence, and of the civilization that Britain had brought into the world. He said with a shrug, that the creation of its Empire had been obtained by means that were often harsh, but 'where are you planing shavings flying'. He compared the British Empire the Catholic Church, saying that both were essential for global stability. He said all he wanted was that England would recognize Germany's position on the continent. The return of the lost colony of Germany was desirable but not essential, and would even offer to support Britain with troops if it had been involved in some trouble somewhere. He observed that the colonies were primarily a question of prestige, since they could not be taken in time of war, and few Germans could settle in the tropics.
"He concluded by saying that his aim was to make peace with England on a basis that it considered incompatible with its honor. "
An incredible story, however, square with the expressed admiration for Hitler's Mein Kampf in Britain. Hitler offered peace to England twice during the Second World War, and, according to Liddell Hart, also showed an atypical shyness in planning an invasion of England, once Churchill had made it clear that his country would not accepted the peace. A strange attitude to be taken in war, a leader, of course, but then, Hitler was a strange man with strange ideas, and a very complex person.
The story is confirmed in Blumentritt General Leon Degrelle, the Belgian Waffen SS, Hitler greatly admired and with whom he occasionally confided. During a discussion with his Fuhrer, Degrelle said: "We talked about England. I asked him bluntly: "Why has not finished the British in Dunkirk? Everyone knew that he could destroy them. " He replied: "Yes, I hold my troops and allowed the British to return to England. The humiliation of a defeat that would have made it difficult to deal with them after the peace. "
Some might challenge the testimony of Degrelle, because it was one of the few ever that Hitler tried to defend after the war. But Liddell Hart argues that men like Blumentritt had no plausible reason to invent such a story, and would actually more favorably impressed with his winning painting themselves as those who had tried to defend safety and survival of the British . Instead, the generals told the story that the British wanted to crush forever, and end the war, while Hitler's hesitation cost them a great, perhaps decisive, victory. If this is true, calls into question the idea that Hitler wanted to conquer the world. I have argued, and evidence, through the mouth of Hitler himself, seem to confirm that his goal was to establish German hegemony on the European continent, and free from foreign interference (especially English ones). But each has his own ideas on this topic. The story of Dunkirk provides important new evidence to the debate.
course, it is hard to find a definitive answer, because of the diversity of opinions. So instead of leaving the reader with my personal impressions, I will conclude with the words of BH Liddell Hart, who ended his discussion of Dunkirk with these charming phrases: "This attitude towards England was determined only policy idea, he had long-cherished, to secure his alliance? Or was it inspired by a deep feeling that prevailed at this critical moment? There were complicating factors in its formation to suggest that he had a mixed feeling of love and hatred towards England similar to the Kaiser? Whatever the true explanation, we can at least be happy with the result. Because his hesitation came to the rescue of England in the most critical moment in its history. "